Don't Bomb Iran

Category: unfinished posts

  • UK officials sold Israel plutonium and heavy water for bomb in 1960s, without telling ministers

    Secret sale of UK plutonium to Israel


    The UK supplied Israel with quantities of plutonium while Harold Wilson was prime minister, BBC Newsnight can reveal.

    The sale was made despite a warning from British intelligence that it might “make a material contribution to an Israeli weapons programme”.Under Wilson, Britain also sold Israel tons of chemicals used to make boosted atom bombs 20 times more powerful than Hiroshima or even Hydrogen Bombs.In Harold Macmillan’s time the UK supplied uranium 235 and the heavy water which allowed Israel to start up its nuclear weapons production plant at Dimona – heavy water which British intelligence estimated would allow Israel to make “six nuclear weapons a year”.
    All export licensing of materials associated with civil nuclear programmes went through stringent checks across Whitehall
    Foreign Office
    Last August on BBC Newsnight we revealed the first British/Israeli deal, the sale of the heavy water, but the government responded by telling the International Atomic Energy Agency the UK was not a party to any sale to Israel and that all it did was sell some heavy water back to Norway. Hundreds of shipments Using Freedom of Information, Newsnight has obtained top secret papers. They show Foreign Minister Kim Howells misled the IAEA and that Britain made not one, but hundreds of secret shipments of nuclear materials to Israel.
    Tony Benn became Minister of Technology in 1966 while the plutonium deal was going through. The nuclear industry was part of his “white heat of technology” brief but no one told him that we were exporting atomic energy materials to Israel.”I’m not only surprised, I’m shocked,” he says, adding that neither he nor his predecessor Frank Cousins, who was a member of CND, agreed to the sales.Benn says he always suspected civil servants were doing deals behind his back but he never thought they would sell plutonium to Israel. “It never occurred to me they would authorise something so totally against the policy of the government.” Dimona

    Back in August 1960 covertly taken photos of a mysterious site at Dimona in Israel arrived at Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) in Whitehall. A brilliant analyst called Peter Kelly immediately realized they showed a secret nuclear reactor and he alerted the rest of British intelligence.

    Kelly recognized it was a French reactor and soon discovered where the heavy water to run it had come from.

    Britain had bought heavy water from Norsk Hydro in Norway for its nuclear weapons programme but found it was surplus to requirements and needed a buyer. The papers obtained by Newsnight show that a company called Noratom acted as a consultant and arranged the deals in return for a 2% commission.Britain knew all along that Israel wanted the heavy water “to produce plutonium” and Israel paid the full military price – £1 million – to avoid safeguards to stop the plutonium being used to make nuclear weapons.Kelly discovered a charade was played out with the UK and Israeli delegations sitting in adjacent rooms while Noratom ferried separate contracts to and fro so Britain could say they hadn’t signed a deal with Israel. Cover story

    Once the press heard about Dimona in December 1960 there was an international outcry. Israel put out a cover story that it was a small research reactor. This did not fool Kelly. Using the figure of 20 tons of heavy water he estimated that Israel could build a reactor capable of producing “significant quantities of plutonium”.

    British intelligence learnt there was also a reprocessing plant and concluded “the separation of plutonium can only mean that Israel intends to produce nuclear weapons”. Kelly even discovered that an Israeli observer had been allowed to watch one of the first French nuclear tests in Algeria.Kelly and his colleagues in intelligence soon found their views about Israel were being challenged by Britain’s representative at the IAEA Mike Michaels, who worked for one of the main figures in Harold Macmillan’s Cabinet – Lord Hailsham.Michaels received a JIC report early in 1961 estimating Israel would take at least three years to make enough plutonium and then another six months to work out how to make a bomb.But it occurred to him that a friendly power might give Israel a small sample of plutonium to speed up the process. “Perhaps the French have supplied a small quantity for experimental purposes as we did to the French in like circumstances some years ago,” he noted in the margin of the report. A few years later Michaels persuaded the UK to sell Israel a small sample of plutonium when he was aware – as this note shows – that this might cut months off the time it took them to get the Bomb.

    Invitation

    The Israeli nuclear chief, Ernst David Bergmann, personally invited Michaels to Israel. Kelly warned Israel might use Michaels as part of a disinformation campaign to show “everything is above board”. Michaels was given VIP treatment. He met not only Bergmann but Shimon Peres and Prime Minister David Ben Gurion – the three fathers of the Israeli Bomb.

    As Kelly suspected, Michaels’ report gave Israel the all clear and he handed it to Hailsham at a crucial time, two days before Ben Gurion met Harold Macmillan at Downing Street.

    In 1962 the Dimona reactor started turning uranium into plutonium, thanks to the heavy water Britain had delivered, but Michaels continued to protest Israel’s innocence.Then at the beginning of 1966 UK Atomic Energy Authority made what they remarkably called a “pretty harmless request”. They wanted to export 10 milligrammes of plutonium to Israel. The MoD strongly objected and Defence Intelligence wrote directly to say the sale might have “significant military value”.The Foreign Office told UKAEA “It is HMG’s policy not to do anything which would assist Israel in the production of nuclear weapons” and therefore they blocked the sale. Sale

    Michaels wrote angrily “to protest strongly” against the decision. Five years earlier he had noted such a sale could speed up the Israeli bomb programme, now he was powerfully advocating just that. He said small quantities of plutonium were not important and anyhow if we didn’t sell it to the Israelis someone else would. The Foreign Office gave in and the sale went ahead. Kelly believes Mike Michaels knew all along that Israel was after the Bomb. He died in 1992.

    Tony Benn is incredulous that Michaels never referred the Israeli nuclear sales to him or Frank Cousins. They were after all the ministers in charge of Britain’s nuclear industry including imports and exports. “Michaels lied to me. I learned by bitter experience that the nuclear industry lied to me again and again”.

    The atomic files, which have been classified until now, detail hundreds of nuclear deals with Israel flagged up as sensitive.

    Benn’s initial reaction to whether Harold Wilson knew about atomic exports to Israel was “it’s inconceivable”. Then he muses: “Harold was sympathetic to Israel,” before concluding that this was probably a conspiracy by civil servants and the nuclear industry to flout HMG policy.

    This report was shown on Newsnight on Thursday, 9 March, 2006.

    Story from BBC NEWS:
    http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/4789832.stm

    Published: 2006/03/10 11:07:56 GMT

  • IAEA can not “conclude that there are no undeclared materials or activities in Iran” or in Iraq

    This phrase has frequently appeared in media reports, and in IAEA reports: for example the February 4 2006 IAEA resolution GOV/2006/13 . However, it is hard to imagine any country where the IAEA could conclude this logically – proving a negative is very hard. They could not say this about Japan or South Korea for example.

    Virtually the same phrase was used by the IAEA about Iraq: in July 1998 Russia suggested that the Iraq should be considered to have disarmed and deadly sanctions should be lifted, but the US rejected this on the basis of an IAEA report which said:
    “While no indications of the current existence of proscribed equipment or materials in Iraq have been found…[the IAEA cannot] provide absolute assurance of the absence of readily concealable items, such as components of centrifuge machines or copies of weapon-related documentation.”

    There are probably other, later examples of IAEA being unable to guarantee anything in Iraq.

  • All those allegations – a discussion

    Below is an extract from a good discussion go to this page at TPMCAFE

    First on poster listed the common allegation, then another poster replied with some explanations

    ALLEGATIONS

    Evidence

    I described the IAEA’s issues with Iran yesterday and discussed some US suspicions of Iran here.

    A partial list of suspicious Iranian actions includes:

    –failing to disclose numerous nuclear programs and activities to the IAEA for  a very long time.  These include plutonium separation experiments, uranium enrichment and conversion experiments, two different enrichment programs (laser and P-2 centrifuge), a huge centrifuge facility, the importation of various uranium compounds, and attempts to procure hot cells.

    — Concealing sites and destroying evidence (e.g., burying the Natanz centrifuge facility and sanitizing a facility where Iranian scientists enriched uranium).

    –Starting an expensive nuclear program in the middle of the war with Iraq.

    –Failing to cooperate fully with the IAEA.  The IAEA has repeatedly criticized Iran for being  slack about providing access to documents and personnel.

    –Making false statements to the IAEA.  For example, Iran falsely claimed that it hadn’t enriched uranium when it actually had. Iran also claimed that it hasn’t procured any foreign components for its P-2 centrifuge program.  That wasn’t true either.

    –Possessing the design for a missile warhead that might be for the delivery of nuclear weapons.

    –Possessing documents and conducting experiments that have few, if any, non-weapons applications ( the uranium casting document and polonium-210 experiments).

    –Developing a heavy water reactor (a potentially excellent plutonium factory) that Tehran claims is for producing medical isotopes, even though they already have a reactor with unused capacity that is capable of doing so.

    –Tehran’s insistence on continuing with its program RIGHT NOW when there’s no good reason for them to do so.

    –Iran claims to be developing a large civilian nuclear power program but doesn’t have anywhere near the required amount of indigenous uranium.  (It does, however, have enough uranium for about 250-300 nuclear weapons.)

    On one hand,  I find it hard to believe that these are all coincidences. It’s not that any one is all that damning  (for example, an economically inefficient project is not by itself very convincing evidence of ill intent), but there’s a pretty long list of things to explain away.

    On the other…

    The evidence that Iran is currently  pursuing undeclared nuclear activities isn’t all that good – many of the activities discussed above took place some years ago (e.g. plutonium and polonium experiments, the acquisition of P-1 centrifuge documents and components, uranium imports)  A track record of untrustworthy behavior gives good reason to be suspicious, but it’s not damning evidence of a nuclear weapons program.

    Furthermore, when one looks at what Iran is currently doing in the nuclear arena, the list is not as scary as you might think.  Iran has, for example, said it won’t reprocess spent reactor fuel, it has given up on laser enrichment, and the IAEA hasn’t found any new safeguards violations for a while.

    It could well be that Iran has something to hide But there are alternative explanations for some of Iran’s lapses of cooperation.  For example, failure to turn over all the relevant documents could be the product of bureaucratic incompetence or right hand/left hand issues. It’s worth noting that Iraqi officials destroyed some WMD and related materials without the knowledge of Saddam Hussein. Snafus like that were partly responsible for Iraq’s inability to account for some of its WMD and related materials.

    Recent bureaucratic changes in Iran may give some plausibility to the above explanations.

    Jeffrey already posted about the bureaucratic changes related to Iran’s nuclear program. I will just add that a decreasing role for  Iran’s military could mean a couple of things:

    1.A decision to end (or at least reduce) nuclear weapons efforts.

    2. Some of Iran’s lack of cooperation may be the result of incompetence and turf fighting which frequently accompanies bureaucratic shifts.  For example, some documents may have been lost, others may have been deliberately withheld by dissenting officials.

    Constraints

    Even if Iran develops a uranium enrichment capability, it still faces some constraints:

    –Iran has limited amounts of indigenous uranium.  This is a possible choke point –  if Iran, for example has to export its uranium to Russia and can’t import any of its own , they’ll have limited

    –the CIA has said that Iran probably can’t use safeguarded facilities to produce fissile material without getting caught.

    –the IAEA has sweet skills, provided that they get the proper access.  Example – the Iranians cleaned out and repainted a workshop to cover up the fact that they had enriched uranium there.  The IAEA still determined what Iran had done in remarkable detail.

    –Testing – if Iran can’t test nuclear weapons,  they can only produce fairly simple weapons – not the kind that are deliverable by longer-range missiles.

    The issue which is very much open to question, is whether they can put their skills gained from centrifuge R&D to use in secret facilities.  But most experts seem to think that it is fairly easy to hide centrifuge facilities, but not so easy to hide uranium conversion facilities [cautionary note – the jury still seems to be out on the latter issue].

    On top of that, it seems to me that Iran would have a tough time concealing the movement of tons and tons of  uranium to a secret conversion facility.   Iran could go the route of acquiring centrifuge feedstock from abroad, but that carries its own risks.

    ——————————

    SOME EXPLANATIONS

    On February 10, 2006 – 1:39pm hass said:
    There are several problems with your list of “evidence” against Iran. The evidence you cite is actually mostly innuendo and invitations to speculate.

    — Failing to disclose numerous nuclear programs and activities to the IAEA for a very long time: In fact Iran’s plans to start enrichment were openly reported on Iranian radio, and the IAEA knew about & inspected Iran’s uranium mines in 1992. Iran attempted to enter into legal contract with several countries to obtain the technology which it was ENTITLED to, but the US repeatedly thwarted Iran’s efforts. Finally, several other nations have been caught cheating much more egregiously on their NPT obligations — including several US allies — but no speculation about secret nuclear weapons programs are promoted about them.

    — The the design for a missile warhead that “might be” for the delivery of nuclear weapons were obtained from the “Magic Laptop that Fell From the Skies” into US hands that supposedly was obtained from someone who got it from someone else …who is conveniently dead. If you believe that, then I have a “Mobile Biological Weapons Lab” to sell you.

    — Considering Iran’s experiences with Iraqi air attacks during the Iran-Iraq war, burying energy production sites seems to be a perfectly reasonable thing to do when you’re repeatedly threatened with bombings.

    — Iran did not ‘start an expensive nuclear program in the middle of the war with Iraq” — it restarted its program in 1981, about a year after the war started. In 1983, the IAEA was planning to cooperate in Iran’s enrichment program (the US ended that cooperation, contrary to the NPT.) And considering that even today Iran is judged to be 5-10 years away from making a bomb, then it would have been very very optimistic for the Iranians to start this program during the war in the hopes of obtaining a bomb within the timeframe of the war. In fact, if we agree to your premise that the program was “expensive” then it would be a huge and unreasonable risk to start a nuclear weapons program in the “middle” of the Iran-Iraq war in the hopes of obtaining a nuclear weapon in time.

    — Iran’s heavy water reactor is under IAEA safeguards and at best could hope to produce only enough plutonium for ONE nuclear weapon PER YEAR…not exactly a very efficient way of building a nuclear arsenal, is it?

    — The amount of indigenous uranium in Iran is unknown since exploration has only recently started, and Iran has never claimed that it will be alway 100% reliant on domestically- produced uranium. Just because your indigenous energy resoures won’t meet 100% of your energy demand doesn’t mean you simply ignore those resources. You can still use them to supplement your energy. After all, the US and Britain exploit their indigenous oil resources in Alaska and the North Sea, in addition to importing oil from other places.

    — Iran voluntarily turned over the enriched uranium casting diagrams, which are actually not terribly useful for making bombs since A) they have no measurements or other necessary details to be used, and B) diagrams on how to build bombs are found all over the internet and C) the construction of nuclear weapons isn’t exactly secret. This is 60 year old technology.

    — Failing to cooperate with the IAEA — when the IAEA is making demands on Iran which go way beyond Iran’s obligations is hardly a sin especially when other countries who were caught conducting much more egregious violations of the NPT were not similarly treated. In fact, on numerous occasions Iran provided greater access than it was obligated, and the demands for yet more concessions from Iran simply increased. Also, in Jan 2006, the IAEA reported that “Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency . . . including by providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and access to locations.”

    — Tehran’s insistence on continuing with its program RIGHT NOW — in fact Iran has been trying to develop this program since the mid-1970’s. Secondly, it will take a few years for Iran to be able to master the technology, so now is as good a time to start as any. Considering that Iran’s VOLUNTARY and TEMPORARY suspension of enrichment during the course of the Paris Agreements negotiations was falsely characterized as a PERMANENT LEGAL OBLIGATION by the US and EU, then Iran knows darn well that waiting is equivalent to giving up that right.

    I can go on and on…but there is a difference between SPECULATION and evidence.

  • Neocon – some biogs of leading ‘thinkers’

    I borrowed this from http://www.apfn.net/messageboard/05-26-04/discussion.cgi.30.html

    For your further reference, here are some of the key neoconservatives:

    Paul Wolfowitz
    Current Deputy Secretary of Defense. Co-wrote the infamous 1992 draft “Defense Planning Guidance” that promoted US military dominance over Eurasia and preemptive strikes against countries suspected of developing WMDs. The draft was deemed so outrageous that it had to be almost completely rewritten. Following 9/11, substantial parts of it became key points in the 2002 US National Security Strategy.

    Michael Ledeen
    One of the most radical neocons and special adviser to Karl Rove in foreign policy matters. Ledeen co-founded the Coalition for Democracy in Iran in 2001. Quote from a 2003 address for the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs: “[T]he time for diplomacy is at an end; it is time for a free Iran, free Syria, and free Lebanon.” Ledeen is an admirer of totalitarian political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) and author of the book “Machiavelli on Modern Leadership: Why Machiavelli’s Iron Rules Are as Timely and Important Today as Five Centuries Ago”. In his 1972 book Universal Fascism, he promoted the fascist movement as a right-wing revolution fueled by “a desire to renew”.

    Richard Perle
    Nicknamed “Prince of Darkness” for his tough stance on foreign policy issues. Founding member of the Jewish Institute for National Security and the Center for Security Policy. Until March 2003, Chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board. Co-authored a 1996 memorandum for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” that reveals parts of the “creative destruction” strategy for the Middle East, starting with Iraq.

    Douglas Feith:
    Current Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director at the Center for Security Policy. Former protégé of Richard Perle’s; well-known as a supporter of the Israeli right-wing Likud Party. In 1997, Feith and his father were honored for their “service to Israel and the Jewish people” by the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) at its 100th anniversary banquet.

    William Kristol
    Son of neocon “godfather” Irving Kristol, chief of staff under the Reagan and Bush I administrations, editor of the Weekly Standard. Founder and current Chairman of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a think tank uniting right-wing Republicans, Christian fundamentalist leaders, and neocons in their pursuit of global US military dominance.

    Lewis “Scooter” Libby
    Current chief of staff, national security adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney, adviser with the RAND corporation’s Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, founding member of the PNAC. Libby co-signed the 2000 report titled “Rebuilding America’s Defenses-Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century” that urged for an invasion of Iraq. He also co-authored the above mentioned ’92 draft “Defense Planning Guidance” for then-Defense Secretary Cheney.

    Elliott Abrams
    Special assistant to the President and Senior Director on the National Security Council for Southwest Asia, Near East, and North African Affairs. Worked for Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson and held various State Department posts under Ronald Reagan. Married to Rachel Decter, daughter of Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter. Abrams pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress about the Iran-Contra affair in 1991 and was pardoned by President George H.W. Bush in 1992.

    Max Boot
    Editorial features editor at the Wall Street Journal, Olin senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, contributing editor to the Weekly Standard and many other newspapers. Most recently, Boot authored “The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power” (2002). Publisher’s Weekly, which reviewed the book, commented that Boot “has a reputation as a fire-breathing polemicist and unabashed imperialist.”

    Robert Kagan
    Former principal speechwriter to Secretary of State George P. Shultz (1984-85); hired by Elliott Abrams as deputy for policy in the State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Co-founder of the PNAC; senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP); writer for various newspapers. Kagan wrote the bestseller “Of Paradies and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order”. His wife, Victoria Nuland, is Dick Cheney’s deputy national security adviser.

  • Israel’s nuclear weapons submarines: Germany builds two more Dolphins

    Peter Morris March 2006

    Germany paid about $800 million to build three nuclear-weapons capable submarines for Israel after the 1991 Gulf War. For years, Israel has hinted the subs are strategic, second-strike nuclear deterrent weapons. They carry US-supplied nuclear-capable missiles, and have been tested with long-range cruise missiles: few analysts doubt that Israel has actually fitted nukes to them, but there is no proof. A former Pentagon official told the Washington Post in 2002, “It is above top secret knowing whether the sub-launched cruise missiles are nuclear-armed.” Another former official added, “We often don’t ask.” Germany in 2005 agreed to sell Israel two more, and the deal, for fuel-cell driven (air-independent) subs was signed in July 2006 for $1.27 billion, with Germany paying a third of the cost. The deal is probably illegal under EU law.

    dolphin_f1.JPG

    Israel’s deterrent:
    For decades, Israel has refused to confirm or deny that it has nuclear weapons, sticking to a statement that it “will not be the first to introduce” nukes to the Middle East – a meaningless statement, as NATO nukes have been in Turkey for years. However, every analyst in the world, and every government in the world, assumes that Israel has 200-400 nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear (hydrogen) and possibly neutron weapons. For delivering them, Israel has aircraft bombs, Jericho II missiles (similar to the US Pershing, range to 1200km), and possibly an ICBM version of the Shavit space launch vehicle, with a possible range of 7,000 km with a 300kg nuclear warhead. These are all land-based, and thus vulnerable to missile attack; so, like other nuclear weapon states, Israel has openly sought to build a submarine-based nuclear “deterrent”. Not only Iran but also Pakistan are possible targets: Israel is worried that if the pro-Western, secular military dictatorship in Pakistan falls to a more “fundamentalist” regime, it may “need” submarine missiles of 1500km range to threaten Pakistans nuclear facilities.
    Proliferation: Various international treaties and national laws restrict trade to countries that have built nuclear weapons. For example, the US “don’t ask” policy is essential because, if it accepted the truth, US legislation should mandate the termination of military aid to Israel (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act- the 1976 Symington amendment – and the 1985 Solarz amendment). Oddly, although the official line is that the US does not ask about an Israeli bomb, the US government declared Israel to be a nuclear proliferator in 1997, when the Dimona nuclear complex and Ben Gurion university were added to a Export Administration Regulation list of ‘entities’ banned from US trade because they engage in nuclear proliferation – a position they share with A.Q. Kahn’s infamous Pakistani institute.
    France, Britain, Norway and South Africa are known to have secretly helped Isreal’s weapons program, as is well documented elsewhere. (British officials gave Israel plutonium and heavy water for its bomb without informing ministers). Germany built and gave Israel submarines which Israel hints are launch platforms for nuclear-armed cruise missiles, and has agreed to build two more. The USA supplied nuclear-capable Harpoon missles for the submarines, and possibly is providing basing for them in the Indian Ocean.

    Germany knowingly proliferating WMD?
    Although Israel’s nukes are common knowledge, it is not widely known that Israel has three Dolphin submarines, some based in the Indian Ocean, that carry nuclear-capable missiles with a reported range of 1500km (900miles). Germany built the three submarines, despite widespread public statements that Israel would arm them with nuclear weapons – and paid the bill. German taxpayers paid $800 million of the $1 billion bill, paying for two and a half of the three submarines.

    Because delivery systems for nuclear weapons are restricted by counterproliferation treaties and laws, it seems clear that Germany knowingly engaged in nuclear proliferation. And because the submarines did sea trials in Norway in 1999 – under German flag – it is possible that the Norwegians also were aware of the submarines capability (ref 2). Furthermore, German law about any weapons export is very strict, with arms-trade forbidden to countries with: poor human rights records, to countries at war, to countries which have not comitted to nuclear non-proliferation treaties and of weapons that might add to regional tensions. It would seem the Dolphins fail all of these tests laid out in EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, but there has been very little debate about this in Germany.

    Timeline: The following timeline is gathered from several sources listed below. It shows that for many years there were clear public indications that Israel intended to put nukes on these submarines. Note also the contract timing: Israel thought about the project for years, ordered submarines in mid 1989, cancelled the contract fifteen months later, just after Iraq invaded Kuwait, but revived it two months later when German Chancellor Kohl agreed to pick up the bill.

    Early 1980s Israel started seeking replacement for its old Gal submarines.

    Aug 1989 Contract for three? submarines signed by Rabin (ref 2) at $340 million each. Reports suggest the subs will be built in Germany by German companies under a US main contractor, to allow the use of US government Foreign Military Sales funds (ref 3). The USA has no expertise in building diesel-electric submarines, and FMS funds are meant to be spent in the USA.

    August 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait,

    Oct 1990 US has large numbers of troops in Saudi Arabia, it is reported that Israel is under pressure to NOT retaliate should Saddam attack it with Scud missiles.

    Nov 1990 Nov 30 Israel cancels contract for three submarines, as “too expensive” (according to Dolphin website project page)

    Dec 1990 Former head of navy Botzer, tells Israeli TV that subs are strategic deterrent weapons, not ordinary naval weapons for sinking ships. (Ref 4)

    Jan 17 1991 Gulf War starts, Iraqi scuds land in Israel, gas masks issued to civilians amid chemical weapon fears. Israel does not respond.

    Jan 30 1991 Two weeks after Gulf War, and two months after Israel cancelled their order, Chancellor Kohl agrees to build and pay for the construction first two submarines. (Estimated cost $640m). Sale said to be an apology for discovery that German companies sold Saddam weapons in 1980s.

    1993 Israeli intelligence estimates Iran will have nuclear-armed missiles by 2000

    1994 April, contract changes to include the third submarine, half paid for by Israel, half Germany.

    1998 Israeli intelligence estimates Iran will have nuclear-armed missiles by 2003-2005 and already has four ex-Soviet nukes. (ref 4)

    1998 Washington Times reports the subs are for nuclear weapons, citing Israeli intelligence and political sources (ref 4)

    1999 First submarine handed over by Germany

    2000 Second and third submarine commissioned

    2000 Israeli intelligence estimates Iran will have nuclear-armed missiles by 2002

    2000 June: Israeli submarine tests nuclear-capable cruise missile with 1500km range in the Indian Ocean, reports the Sunday Times. Possibly a variant Popeye missile.

    2005 The semi-official Dolphin submarine website notes that “while the subs are likely more important as a nuclear deterrent to land-based attacks, the Dolphin submarines offers Israel superior naval capabilities to its neighbors, as well“

    2005 November on his last day in office, Gerhard Schroeder, head of the outgoing German SDP-Greens government, agreed in principle to sell another two Dolphins to Israel, and contract negotiations are ongoing. It is reported that Germany agreed to pay up to 333 million Euros of an estimated 1000 million cost – which would bring the German “donation” total to over $1000 million. The new subs are expected to be delivered in about 2012, and will use fuel cells instead of diesel-electric propulsion.

    Basing and operations
    The subs reportedly patrol in the Indian Ocean. Their endurance is reportedly 30 days, with a cruising range of 4,500 nautical miles, which makes it impossible to commute 20,000 miles from Haifa, round Africa to the Indian Ocean. So does Egypt let them through the Suez canal, or are they based in the Indian Ocean? There are no known submarine pens at Eilat, Israel’s only port with access to the Indian Ocean. It was reported by Arab sources in 2001 that Israel was seeking to use Russia’s old sub base in Eritrea, but it appears that was refused. The US/UK base at Diego Garcia is another possibility; it is reported Dolphins have visited to pick up Harpoon missiles, but basing facilities there would be diplomatically difficult. Other, more secret locations have been suggested, but no information is published.

    Non standard torpedo tubes for cruise missiles?
    The submarine has the capacity to carry up to 16 surface-to-surface missiles or torpedoes. Israel says it is acknowledged armed with the submarine-version of the US Harpoon missile, which has a range of about 130km with a payload of 227kg – enough for a nuclear weapon – and which fits a standard torpedo tube.

    dolphin_t1.jpg

    Four of the ten topedo tubes are reportedly larger than almost-universal 533mm tube size: with a 650mm diameter, this was just one expensive change that Israel wanted to the standard submarine design. (apparently confirmed by torpedo room photo above, from israeli-weapons.com) Officially, it is suggested the extra 12cm could provide the capability of launching swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs), while with liners the tubes could be narrowed down for torpedoes. However, SDVs are traditionally mounted externally, on the decks of submarines when needed, and are much larger than 650mm diameter, which is little more than the width of an operators shoulders. The submarines also have large dive chambers for deploying swimmers and their equipment, casting doubt on the SDV story.

    What cruise missile was tested in 2000 is a mystery. As the major targets for an Israeli nuclear “deterrent” are far inland in Iran and Pakistan, the US-supplied Harpoon missiles would not have the necessary range – at least 1000km. Several analysts suggest the special extra-wide tubes are to accommodate Israeli-designed Popeye long-range cruise missiles, about which little is published. Ironically, Israeli cooperation with Iran on a seabased cruise missile was reported to the Rumsfeld Commission on missile threats, but such research was decades ago in the Shah’s time (ref 7). Apart from the US and Russia, Pakistan is the only country with an acknowledged and tested medium range cruise missile – it has been hinted that the surprisingly advanced Babur was possibly copied from some US ones which crashed in Pakistan – which can also be launched by Pakistan’s submarines.

    The Soviet Union built a few submarines with wider tubes of the same 650mm size – used for some topedos and the sub-version of the SS-N-21 Sampson nuclear cruise missile, which was reportedly deployed on the Akula, Victor III, Yankee Notch, and Sierra class SSN submarines. The SSC-4 coastal defense variant was carried in a 650-mm diameter canister, had a 200 kiloton yield and a CEP of 45 metres at 3000km range, although other versions other versions might fit in narrower tubes.

    References:
    1 http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/dolphin/

    2 The semi-official Dolphin website http://www.dolphin.org.il/dolphins/

    3 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/sub/index.html

    4 Israel buying 3 Submarines to carry nuclear missiles Washington Times July 1 1998

    5. Israel has sub-based nuclear arms capability Walter Pincus Washington Post June 15, 2002; Page A01

    6. Israel Expands its Nuclear Threat Thanks to German “donation” of Dolphin subs” Robert Stauffer in Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, Dec 2003

    7. see Appendix 3, unclassified working papers Israeli ballistic Missile Developments footnote 33 W. Seth Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s (Westport,Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), pp. 148-149.

    8. ibid, footnote 24

    9. Germany may Sell 2 More Dolphin Subs to Israel for $1.17 billion, Defense Industry daily23 Nov 2005

    Other Press links from the Dolphin site:

    Ha’aretz Navy eyes 2 new Dolphin submarines
    Daily Times – Pakistan Israel seeks more submarines for strategic depth
    Los Angeles Times Israel Adds Fuel to Nuclear Dispute
    FAS – Federation of American Scientists Israel Special Weapons Guide – Submarines
    Popeye Turbo Cruise Missile
    Washington Post Israel Has Sub-Based Atomic Arms Capability
    The Guardian Israel to get subs with nuclear ability
    Ha’aretz Swimming with the Dolphins
    Al Ahram German subs for Israel
    Jane’s IDR First Dolphins move in on Israeli navy
    Global Intelligence Israel Moves – Quickly – To Beef Up Its Submarine Force
    The Sunday Times Israel makes nuclear waves with submarine missile test
    Portsmouth Herald German-built submarine ushers in new era for Israeli navy
    Monitor Israel’s covert nuclear program
    World Tribune Israel’s new sub fleet upsets Arab neighbors
    ME Intelligence Bulletin Israel Acquires First Nuclear-Capable Sub
    World Tribune Suddenly, Israel has a potent navy
    The Washington Times Israel buying 3 submarines to carry nuclear missiles
    Analisi Difesa Nuclear Missiles for the Israeli Submarines?

  • Iran has more missile than any others in middle east says Negroponte (unfinished)

    find this quote. many are on the drawing board. almost certainly Israel has more, as does the United States

  • Iran supplied roadside bomb shaped charges to Iraqi insurgents – later denied (unfinished)

    this needs referencing

    US and UK officials openly accused Iran of supplying shaped-charges to Iraqi insurgents in 2005.  Although military officials said they had no evidence of this, the accusations continued for some time, then were officially dropped, from memory.

  • Enrichment suspension only for a few months, says Iran in 2004

    from Spacewar Nov 2004

    Iran says nuclear suspension may last only a few months

    TEHRAN (AFP) Nov 17, 2004
     A senior Iranian official said Wednesday that Tehran was only likely to suspend sensitive nuclear activities surrounding the enrichment of uranium for a few months.“We will give the nuclear experts of both sides three months. If the work groups reach an agreement, suspension will not make any sense anymore,” diplomat and nuclear negotiator Hossein Moussavian told state television.

    “Within three to four months at the most, we should reach a stage where we have an overall conclusion. If they come to no conclusion or say the only visible guarantee would be to halt enrichment altogether, Iran will not accept this,” he added.

    In an accord with Britain, France and Germany, the Islamic republic has agreed to suspend enrichment activities during negotiations on a longer-term solution to the nuclear stand-off.

    The deal brokered by the so-called EU-3 offered Iran trade, security and technological incentives in return for the “confidence-building measures” aimed at easing widespread fears the regime is seeking nuclear weapons.

    It came just ahead of a meeting of the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and has undermined US efforts to have Iran referred to the UN Security Council for possiblle sanctions.

    The deal stipulates that Iran and the EU are to set up working groups and begin discussions in mid-December on a long-term deal that would provide “objective guarantees” Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons as well as advance talks on a potentially lucrative trade and cooperation agreement.

    Iran has committed itself to maintain its enrichment suspension while the negotiations are in progress, but Moussavian’s comments signal that Iran is unwilling to see them drag on far into 2005.

    Ideally the EU-3 would like Iran to abandon its fuel cycle work altogether. Iran says it only wants to enrich uranium to make fuel for power generation, but there are fears that it could later produce highly-enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb.

    But Iran is standing by its right to the fuel cycle, saying enrichment for peaceful purposes is permitted by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But it has said it is ready to discuss ways in which it can operate the fuel cycle under full IAEA supervision that would ease any alarm.

    Moussavian’s comments also come amid presure on pragmatists in the Iranian regime from hardliners in parliament, who have blasted the deal with the Europeans as a climbdown.

  • Timeline of Israeli nuke issues 1990-1999, from NTI

    see http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Nuclear/3635_5223.html

    Nuclear Chronology

    1990-1999
    This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

    Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
    26 February 1990
    In a question and answer session with members of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Deputy Foreign Minister Shimon Peres makes a public remark about Israel’s nuclear program, referring to it as strategic asset. He says: “We have everything that a small nation can have. Tell me, are there any other countries that produce a plane of our own, a missile of our own, and tank of our own, a missile boat of our own?” He adds that, “we have something in Dimona which is called textile industry.”
    —”Peres Makes Rare Reference to Israeli Nuclear Program,” Associated Press, 26 February 1990.

    January 1991
    Israel goes on nuclear alert once during operation Desert Storm. Hundreds of nuclear warheads are armed in response to Iraqi Scud missile attacks against Israel.
    — “Persian Gulf war: The revised version of the ‘mother of all battles’ was a dud. So, it turns out, was the coverage,” Toronto Star, 26 February 1994; see also Hersh, Seymour, The Sampson Option (New York: Random House, 1991).

    17 February 1991
    Iraq claims to have carried out “destructive strikes” against the town of Dimona with three missiles. Israeli officials report that one missile landed in the Negev desert, but refuse to say if the Dimona reactor is the target.
    —”Iraq Says It Aimed Missiles at Israeli Reactor; Says Allies Face Defeat,” Associated Press, 17 February 1991; “The Gulf War: Nuclear Plant is Targeted by Iraq,” The Guardian (London), 18 February 1991.

    25 February 1991
    Iraq fires two SCUS missiles at Israel, one of them landing in the Negev desert region. Israeli officials report that the missiles caused no damage.
    —”Iraq Lobs Two Scuds at Israel,” United Press International, 25 February 1991, “The Week That Was,” The Jerusalem Post, 28 February 1991.

    29 May 1991
    American President George Bush proposes an initiative to create a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. The proposed initiative, involving all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, would also discontinue the sale of all non-conventional weapons to Middle Eastern states and would subject all nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.
    —”Bush Wages War on Arms Race,” The Times, 30 May 1991.

    24 October 1991
    The New York-based journal Nucleonics Week reports that a fire broke out in at the Dimona reactor. Israeli officials deny the charge.
    —”Americans Cry ‘Fire’,” The Jerusalem Post, 24 October 1991.

    December 1991
    Israel returns 10.5 tons of heavy water to Norway, exactly half the amount if purchased in 1959 and 1971. Israeli officials say that the remaining 10.5 tons have been lost through waste and evaporation over the years.
    —”Israeli Heavy Water Returned to Norway,” Agence France Presse, 3 December 1991, Stanghelle, Harold, “Israel to Sell Back 10.5 Tons.” Arbeiderbladet, Oslo, Norway, 28 June 1990 in: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Nuclear Developments,” 28 June 1990, 34-35; online, Internet 22 November 1998, .

    5 January 1993
    The Egyptian Al-Sha’b newspaper alleges that Israel is increasing the capacity of the Dimona reactor in order to increase the yield of plutonium separation units.
    —”Egyptian Paper Claims Israel Increasing Capacity of Dimona Nuclear Reactor,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 January 1993.

    9 June 1993
    Israeli authorities take a group of journalists and environmentalists on a tour of the site adjacent to the Dimona facility to quell rumors that it is leaking contaminants into the surrounding environment.
    —”Tour Given in Area of Usually Off-Limits Nuclear Reactor,” Associated Press, 9 June 1993.

    26 January 1994
    Former Soviet KGB agent Yuri Linov reveals that he had penetrated Israel’s top secret nuclear laboratories He claims that he entered Israel disguised as a Jewish immigrant from Austria in 1968. For five years he operated a ring of agents, including informants working at the reactors at Dimona and Nachal Soreq, but discovered, he believes, “nothing new.”
    —”Ex-KGB Spy Says He Penetrated Israel’s Top Secret Nuclear Facilities,” Associated Press, 26 January 1994; “KGB Nuclear Spy Details Add to Israel Security Fears,” The Times, 27 January 1994.

    27 January 1994
    Israel invites Egyptian scientists to visit Dimona to verify that there is no basis to rumors about environmental damage caused by the reactor. Israeli officials accuse the Egyptian government of spreading rumors of radiation leaks for political reasons.
    —”Israel Invites Egypt to Check Radioactivity at Dimona Reactor,” Agence France Presse, 27 January 1994.

    November 1994
    Jane’s Intelligence Review estimates in its November issue that Israel has 7 nuclear facilities and as many as 200 nuclear weapons in a detailed review based on satellite images of Israel. The report also indicates that Nachal Soreq is the installation where Israel conducts research on nuclear weapons design and claims that nuclear weapons are assembled at a facility in Yodefat.
    —”Jane’s: Israel Has 7 Nuclear Facilities, Up to 200 Nuclear Weapons,” Associated Press, 18 November 1994; Cirincione, Joseph with Wolfsthal, Jon B. and Rajkumar, Miriam, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 224-225.

    24 February 1995
    A New York Times article reports on deteriorating relations between Israel and Egypt over recent Egyptian pressure on Israel to sign the NPT.
    —”Dispute Over Nuclear Treaty Is Souring Relations Between Israel and Egypt,” The New York Times, 24 February 1995.

    26 February 1995
    A Saudi newspaper reports that Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres refuses to grant the Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Mussa access to the Dimona complex after prolonged Egyptian pressure to do so.
    —”Peres Refuses Mussa Trip to Israeli Nuclear Plant: Report,” Agence France Presse, 26 February 1995.

    31 March 1995
    Shimon Peres states that Israel is ready to propose a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and missiles as soon as regional peace is assured.
    —”‘Father’ of Israeli Atom Programme Proposes Nuclear-Free Middle East,” The Times, 31 March 1995.

    23 December 1995
    Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres says, “Give me peace and we’ll give up the nuclear program. That’s the whole story.”
    —”Peres Says Israel, With Regional Pact, Would End Atom Effort,” The New York Times, 23 December 1995.

    24 March 1996
    The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reports that Israel is seeking public recognition by the United States government of its need for nuclear weapons. Such an acknowledgement would represent a drastic change in American policy.
    —”Israel Wants U.S. Recognition of Need for Nuclear Weapons,” Associated Press, 24 March 1996.

    7 April 1996
    Syrian Ba’ath Party Assistant Secretary-General Abdallah al-Ahmar calls for Israeli nuclear facilities to be placed under international supervision.
    —”Syria Wants Action on Israel Nuclear Power,” United Press International, 7 April 1996.

    25 June 1996
    Israel’s most widely circulated daily newspaper, Yediot Ahronot, publishes aerial photos of the Dimona reactor complex obtained via the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The images, acquired through loosened American information laws, are printed on the front page of the paper.
    —”Secret Nuclear Reactor Photos Published,” United Press International, 25 June 1996.

    25 July 1996
    An article published in the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reveals two important aspects of the Israeli nuclear program. The piece reports that expenses for the Nuclear Research Centre in Dimona are paid for out of the defense budget and that Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers serve in Dimona installations. The facts were revealed during a disagreement over the defense budget and salaries of IDF career personnel.
    —”Budget Dispute Said to Reveal Defense Funding for Dimona Nuclear Centre,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 July 1996.

    25 February 1997
    An Iraqi official confirms that Iraq targeted the Dimona nuclear complex with Scud missiles during the 1991 Gulf War. General Abderrazzak Al-Ayubi tells the Iraqi newspaper Al-Jumhuriyah that “ten Iraqi missiles were fired at hostile targets in Haifa, 28 on other targets in Tel Aviv, and five at Dimona.”
    —”Iraq Tried to Hit Israeli Nuclear Plant During Gulf War,” Agence France Presse, 25 February 1997.

    20 April 1997
    The Israeli daily Ha’aretz reports that Former South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad confirms that the South African and Israeli governments helped each other develop nuclear weapons in the early 1980s. The article also quotes South African General Constand Viljoen as saying, “We wanted to get nuclear knowledge from whoever we could, also from Israel.”
    —”Report: Israel Helped South Africa Develop Nuclear Weapons,” Associated Press, 20 April 1997.

    June 1997
    Prompted by allegations that an Israeli university collaborates in the Israeli nuclear weapons program, the United States bars American firms from having business ties with Ben Gurion University. The university allegedly used a U.S. supercomputer for nuclear arms research.
    —”US Orders Boycott of Israeli University Over Alleged Nuclear Arms Link,” Agence France Presse, 12 June 1997.

    30 July 1997
    British-based Jane’s Intelligence Review publishes images indicating that Israeli missile facilities are susceptible to destruction by nuclear attack. The photos show that the Zachariah base southeast of Tel Aviv shows no sign of missile storage silos that can withstand a nuclear blast. These missiles are stored in limestone caves, which cannot be reinforced to provide adequate protection.
    —”Jane’s: Photos Show Israel’s Nuclear Missile Base Vulnerable to Attack,” Associated Press, 30 July 197.

    12 October 1997
    An Israeli court awards compensation to a former Dimona plant worker suffering from cancer due to radiation exposure.
    —”Court: Nuke Reactor Work Caused Cancer,” United Press International, 12 October 1997.

    1997-1998
    In a review of Israel nuclear strategy involving Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the Foreign Ministry, it is decided that Israel should keep its weapons of mass destruction and missiles secret, strengthen its missile defense, and reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear force.
    —Cordesman, Anthony, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003.

    3 February 1998
    Israel deploys four batteries of American Patriot anti-missile missiles on a hill in the southern Negev Desert near Dimona in response to public anxiety about Israeli preparedness for Iraqi-launched Scud missile biological weapons attacks.
    —”Missiles Readied as Fears of Germ Attack Increase,” The Times, 3 February 1998.

    19 February 1998
    The Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv reports that Israeli scientists, in response to the U.S. ban on the export of supercomputers to the Israeli Nuclear Research Centre, have developed a “virtual supercomputer” to perform the same functions. Scientists at Israel’s Technion computer science department have clustered personal computers linked by a network to carry out supercomputer tasks.
    —”‘Virtual Supercomputer’ Developed to Overcome US Ban,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1998.

    13 March 1998
    Mordechai Vanunu, convicted of revealing details of Israel’s nuclear program in 1986, is allowed to leave solitary confinement for the first time in 12 years, but remains in prison serving an 18-year sentence.
    —”Israel End 12 –Year Solitary,” BBC News, 13 March 1998, .

    11 May 1998
    Israeli authorities reveal that they have been holding an Arab Israeli for eight years on charges of spying for Iraq. Munir Fathi Said is to be released early from his 13-year jail term for passing information on Israel’s nuclear program to Iraqi agents.
    —”Israel Reveals It Has Been Holding Spy for Iraq Eight Years,” Agence France Presse, 11 May 1998.

    1 June 1998
    Egypt’s MENA news agency reports that Pakistan’s ambassador to Egypt, Tayyab Siddiqui, alleges that Israel has cooperated in India’s nuclear weapons program. He states that “neutral” sources inside Israel confirm this, but does not reveal those sources.
    —”Envoy to Egypt Says Reports ‘Confirmed’ India-Israel Cooperation,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 June 1998.

    5 June 1998
    Shimon Peres makes remarks alluding to Israel’s nuclear capability in a televised interview. On Israel TV’s Channel Two, Peres said that, “No one made a bomb to use it. Instead, we wanted a veiled nuclear option in order to prevent war.”
    —”Peres Edges Close to Acknowledging Israel’s Nuclear Capability,” Associated Press, 5 June 1998.

    17 June 1998
    Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Silvan Shalom tells the Knesset that rumors of Israel having tested a nuclear device a month earlier are “absolutely without foundation.” Two members of the Knesset had claimed that the alleged test may have triggered an earthquake in the region.
    —”Israel Denies Conducting Nuclear Test in May,” Agence France Presse, 17 June 1998.

    14 July 1998
    The website of The Jordan Times reports that former Israeli Prime Minster Shimon Peres acknowledges Israel’s nuclear weapons program. He is reported to have told an audience of academics and the media in Amman that, “We built a nuclear option, not in order to have a Hiroshima, but to have an Oslo.”
    —”Israeli Labor Party’s Peres Acknowledges Israel Possesses Nuclear Weapons,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 July 1998.

    11 August 1998
    Although it does not commit to open the Dimona nuclear complex to international inspections, Israel opts not to veto motions to begin discussing a treaty to stop production of fissile material at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, according to The Jerusalem Post.
    —”UN Nuclear Parley Begins After Israel Drops Veto,” The Jerusalem Post, 12 August 1998.

    11 August 1998
    The Israeli daily Ma’ariv reports that Israel will sign the treaty, which will include control and supervision mechanisms enabling international inspectors to visit the Dimona nuclear reactor. This decision was made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after consulting with senior Defense and Foreign Ministry officials.
    —”Paper: Israel Ready for Conditional Acceptance of Nuclear Supervision Treaty,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 August 1998.

    October 1998
    Because of military censorship rules in Israel, Avner Cohen publishes his book Israel and the Bomb in the United States. The book gives detailed accounts of the development of Israel’s nuclear program and doctrine of nuclear ambiguity. While Cohen insists that he has done nothing to harm Israel’s security, he asserts that Israel armed two nuclear bombs on the eve of the 1967 war, that U.S. President Eisenhower turned a blind eye to the French-aided construction of Israel’s nuclear reactor, and that the only U.S. president to try to stop Israel’s proliferation was John F. Kennedy.
    —”World: Middle East Book Breaks Israel’s Nuclear Taboo,” BBC News, 21 October 1998, .

    October 1999
    A secret document written by the U.S. Department of Energy claims that Israel possesses 300 to 500 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, enough to produce at least 250 warheads. This information was disclosed in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and on the front page of the Israeli daily Ha’aretz.
    —”Israel Ranked Sixth Nuclear Power by US,” The Times (London), 9 October 1999.

    24 November 1999
    Israel releases 1,200 pages of testimony from the trial of Mordechai Vanunu, the nuclear technician serving an 18-year sentence for reveal details of Israel’s nuclear program. The documents give an account of Vanunu’s stated motives for his actions. Shimon Peres criticizes the release of the transcripts.
    —”Vanunu Trial Extracts Published,” BBC News, 24 November 1999, .

    25 November 1999
    Israeli prison officials deny a newspaper report that Mordechai Vanunu passed bomb-making information to Palestinian security prisoners during walks in the prison yard.
    —”Officials Deny Nuclear Informer Gave Bomb Formulas to Palestinian Inmates,” Associated Press, 25 November 1999.

    25 November 1999
    After it petitioned a court to allow publication, Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot publishes excerpts of the released portions of the trial of Mordechai Vanunu. In the published transcripts are allegations by Vanunu that he was beaten and kicked by Israeli interrogators after his abduction in Rome in 1986.
    —”Vanunu Trial Details Released,” The Times (London), 25 November 1999.

    If anyone even raises his hand against us we’ll take away half his land
    and burn the other half, including the oil. We might use nuclear arms.

  • Western Arming of Saddam with Chemical Weapons, active intelligence, during Iran-Iraq war (incomplete)

    In the eight year war that followed Saddams invasion of Iran in 1980, over one million people died in savage human-wave battles and attacks on civilian targets. Various western countries supportedSaddam economically, militarily and with intelligence. Saddams forces repeated used chemical weapons on the battlefield, and received satellite intelligence from the CIA about their effectiveness. It has been estimated that 100,000 people died from chemical weapon attacks.

    The US shipped a range of “dual use” technologies, including anthrax and chemical ‘precursors’ for chemical weapons; one US branch of an Italian bank lent Saddam over $5 billion, loans partially guaranteed by the US government; and for several years the CIA gave Saddam satellite intelligence, including ‘calibration’ information about the effects on Iranian battle formations from Iraqi mustard gas attacks. For a fuller article about sales see the Wikipedia entry about US-iraqi arms transfers

    For a longer list / chronology see the UN Observer page (NOT a UN document

    As part apology to Israel for helping arm Saddam, the German government built and paid for three Dolphin-class submarines for the Israeli navy. Israel has apparently fitted these submarines with US-supplied Harpoon missiles, some fitted with Israeli-built nuclear warheads and has hinted that they can strike strategic targets in Iran, as they appear to be based in the Indian ocean.
    Iran was awarded billions of dollars in damages from Iraq after the UN decided Saddams attack on it had been an illegal war of agression. Kuwait also received billions for the illegal invasion of their country by Saddam. Interestingly, the UN considers the US-led invasion of Iraq to have also been illegal, but there is little talk of reparations.